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Se refiere al hundimiento de la SHEFFIELD, publicado por el Ministerio de Defensa de Gran Bretaña.

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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FLEET

**LOSS OF HMS SHEFFIELD
BOARD OF INQUIRY**

**Report of Captain Salt
Paragraph 60**

CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN ABANDONING SHIP

60. In making the decision to abandon ship the Commanding Officer took into account the following factors at the time:-

- A. The state of the ship was as follows: (Fig 1)
- (i) There were major fires in Fwd AMR and Fwd ER.
 - (ii) There were major fires in the Officer's Cabin Flat and Bridge structure.
 - (iii) There was a known fire in the area of the Engineer's Workshop and hot screens in the vicinity of Wardroom and Chief Petty Officer's Mess.
 - (iv) Considerable heat on 1 deck waist decks both sides as far back as Mike Cross passage (Starboard worse than Port) indicated substantial fires on 2 Deck passageways.
 - (v) Mike/November 2 deck doors were very hot - with fires at least as far back as MCR/HQ1 area.
 - (vi) Thick dense smoke from bilge to bridge between Golf and Mike sections inclusive with the exception of the After ER and AMR.
 - (vii) Paint blistering on the Forecastle deck just Fwd of Forescreen-indication that the fire was 1 section clear of Seadart Magazine at best.
- B. The heat from the fire was increasing and the extent was escalating even with the assistance of ARROW and YARMOUTH.
- C. Both escorts were receiving appreciable physical damage as they lay alongside. ARROW much more so than YARMOUTH. But structural extent not known.
- D. There was a declared enemy submarine action in our immediate vicinity in progress whilst SHEFFIELD was buying up 2 escorts and a number of Helicopters.
- E. The stage was well passed where the ship could be made to "fight" again without major dockyard assistance.
- F. We had no ship's firemain, under the circumstances no prospect of achieving any and even with the assistance of ARROW and YARMOUTH we were making no progress on any form of re-entry. The Seadart Magazine and 4.5" shell magazine were therefore considered serious threats to safety of life.

Accordingly at 1830 approximately on 4th May, The Commanding Officer gave the order to abandon ship. ARROW remained alongside whilst the majority of Ship's company boarded her without injury. Only a handful went by helicopter to YARMOUTH (plus a few by Gemini) and the remainder were transferred by helicopter to HERMES. Total survivor numbers were as follows:-

HMS ARROW	225
HMS HERMES	35
HMS YARMOUTH	6

HMS ARROW deserves special mention for her excellent assistance not only in rendering firefighting aid but also in her recovery and subsequent care of survivors.