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Se refiere a:

19MAY82 2004Z – UKMIS a FCO. Situación debido a la respuesta argentina.

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NYFC 613/19

ZZ FCO

GRS 1150

SECRET

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 192004Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 786 OF 19 MAY.

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO'S 783 AND 784: FALKLANDS.

1. AS WAS TO BE EXPECTED, EVENTS HERE ARE MOVING WITH BEWILDERING SPEED. I AND MY STAFF HAVE REPORTED SOME OF THEM TO THE PUS BY TELEPHONE. THIS TELEGRAM DESCRIBES THE POSITION UP TO 1900Z ON 19 MAY.
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO ADMIT DEFEAT, BOTH BECAUSE HE DREADS FURTHER CASUALTIES AND BECAUSE HE DOES NOT WANT TO CHALK UP A FAILURE FOR THE UN IN HIS FIRST MAJOR CRISIS. HE IS SUPPORTED IN THIS BY ALL HIS STAFF, INCLUDING URQUHART, THOUGH THE LATTER FULLY UNDERSTANDS OUR POSITION TOO.
3. EARLY THIS MORNING I LEARNED THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS PROPOSING TO PRODUCE A PAPER CONTAINING "MEDIAN" LANGUAGE COVERING TWO OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES - THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AND THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. HIS LANGUAGE WAS NOT AT ALL BAD FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. BUT HE IMMEDIATELY INTERVENED TO SQUASH THIS IDEA, POINTING OUT THAT LIMITED PROPOSALS COVERING ONLY PART OF THE PROBLEM WOULD SIMPLY REOPEN AN ENDLESS PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION AND WOULD THEREFORE BE UNACCEPTABLE TO YOU.
4. I NEXT LEARNED THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD TELEPHONED ROS AND THEN COSTA MENDEZ IN BUENOS AIRES. BOTH HAD INSISTED THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE AND THAT THEIR PAPER OF LAST NIGHT WAS NOT THEIR LAST WORD. AS A RESULT, HE WAS THINKING OF SENDING ENVOYS TO LONDON (URQUHART, SUTTERLIN) AND BUENOS AIRES (CORDOVEZ, DE SOTO). THEIR TICKETS HAD ALREADY BEEN BOOKED. AT A PRIVATE MEETING BEFORE THE WORKING LUNCH DESCRIBED BELOW, I PERSUADED PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO ABANDON THIS IDEA TOO.
5. AT THE END OF THE MORNING PEREZ DE CUELLAR BRIEFED THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS LED LING QING, POSSIBLY AT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S PROMPTING, TO DECIDE TO REVIEW THE INFORMAL CONSULTATION OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL AT 2100Z.

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6. ALL THIS ACTIVITY PROMPTED ME TO ACCELERATE MY PROGRAMME FOR GIVING PEREZ DE CUELLAR OUR FORMAL RESPONSE TO LAST NIGHT'S ARGENTINE PAPER (I HAD SPOKEN TO HIM EARLIER IN THE MORNING IN A PRELIMINARY WAY AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TEL NO 431). PEREZ DE CUELLAR PROPOSED A WORKING LUNCH, AT WHICH HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AN EXPANDED GROUP OF ADVISERS, INCLUDING URQUHART, CORDOVEZ AND SUTTERLIN.

7. AT MY PRIVATE MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR BEFORE THE LUNCH I ASKED HIM FORMALLY TO CONVEY TO ROS THAT H.M. GOVERNMENT FOUND THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. THE ARGENTINE POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED IN SUBSTANCE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO HOPE OF REACHING AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY IN A SINGLE DAY. WE HAD THEREFORE DRAWN A LINE, FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT OUR DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT BY THE DEADLINE OF 12 NOON TODAY. I TOLD PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT WE RECOGNISED THAT THIS WOULD ENABLE ROS TO WRONG-FOOT US BY BLAMING US FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS BUT THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT. AT THE END OF THE PLENARY MEETING DESCRIBED BELOW, PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOLD ME THAT HE HAD SPOKEN ACCORDINGLY TO ROS WHO HAD PASSED BACK A MESSAGE THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION AND WOULD CONVEY IT TO HIS GOVERNMENT.

8. AFTER LUNCH, WE SAT DOWN TO A PLENARY MEETING. I SPOKE FIRST. I SAID THAT LAST NIGHT'S PAPER FROM BUENOS AIRES WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO YOU. IT CONFIRMED THAT THE ARGENTINE POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED IN ANY IMPORTANT REGARD. I LISTED THE UNACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS IN THE PAPER: THE REFERENCE TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS, THE INCLUSION OF THE DEPENDENCIES, THE PROVISION FOR WITHDRAWAL TO NORMAL AREAS OF OPERATION, THE EXCLUSION OF THE COUNCILS FROM THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION (THIS WAS A CENTRAL ISSUE WHERE THE GAP WAS TOTALLY UNBRIDGEABLE), THE PROVISION FOR EQUALITY OF ACCESS ETC, THE FORMULATION ON THE TARGET DATE, THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IF AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED BY 30 JUNE 1983 (ANOTHER KEY ISSUE), AND THE ABSENCE OF THE AGREED LANGUAGE ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT (DITTO). H.M. GOVERNMENT HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WHEREAS WE HAD BEEN EXTREMELY FLEXIBLE IN THE WAY I HAD OUTLINED ON 17 MAY (MY TEL NO 765) ARGENTINA HAD MADE NO CONCESSIONS AT ALL. THE ARGENTINE PAPER WAS NOT A SERIOUS RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS. I HAD MADE CLEAR THAT MAJOR AMENDMENTS TO OUR PROPOSALS OR PROCRASTINATION WOULD IN YOUR VIEW BE TANTAMOUNT TO REJECTION. H.M. GOVERNMENT'S CONSIDERED VIEW WAS THAT AS FROM 1200 NEW YORK TIME TODAY A

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LINE HAD BEEN DRAWN UNDER THE PRESENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. I
CONCLUDED WITH A PERSONAL TRIBUTE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S EFFORTS.
9. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WOULD CONVEY ALL THIS TO ROS, TO
WHOM HE HAD ALREADY GIVEN ADVANCE NOTICE BY TELEPHONE (PARA 7 ABOVE).
HE WOULD BE SEEING HIM AT 2000Z. HE NOTED WHAT I HAD SAID
ABOUT DRAWING A LINE BUT HE HAD TO TELL ME THAT HE INTENDED TO
KEEP HIS OPTIONS OPEN. COSTA MENDEZ HAD ASKED HIM TO TELEPHONE
GALTIERI AND HE WOULD PROBABLY DO THIS. HE WOULD EXPRESS HIS VIEWS
FRANKLY. HE COULD NOT REFUSE TO CONSIDER ANY FORTHCOMING RESPONSE
FROM GALTIERI. IT WOULD BE HIS PERSONAL DUTY TO CONVEY SUCH A
RESPONSE TO ME, EVEN THOUGH I HAD "DRAWN A LINE". AT THIS AFTER-
NOON'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS HE WOULD GIVE THE MEMBERS OF THE
COUNCIL AN ACCOUNT OF HIS DOINGS, AS A PRELUDE TO AN EXHAUSTIVE
REPORT WHEN THE COUNCIL MET FORMALLY, EITHER LATER TONIGHT OR
TOMORROW. HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT WE HAD MISSED THE LAST OPPORT-
UNITY OF SOLVING A DIFFICULT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM: HE BELIEVED
THAT THERE WERE STILL SOME AVENUES OPEN. HE WOULD PASS TO ME ANY
IDEAS WHICH GALTIERI, WHO WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY COSTA MENDEZ,
MIGHT HAVE. HE WOULD TRY TO SELL TO GALTIERI THE IDEAS WHICH THE
SECRETARIAT HAD PRODUCED. THEY WERE REASONABLE AND HE FELT THAT THEY
MIGHT STILL PROVIDE A CHANCE OF MAKING PROGRESS, IN ORDER TO SAVE
YOUNG LIVES.

10. I SAID THAT NO-ONE WAS MORE CONSCIOUS THAN I OF THE DANGER OF
MORE LOSS OF LIFE. BUT EVERY ROUND OF NEGOTIATION WE HAD CONDUCTED
WITH THE ARGENTINES HAD ENDED UP WITH A LAST MINUTE INTERVENTION BY
GALTIERI CLAIMING TO BE REASONABLE. ON EVERY OCCASION THAT HAD
LED NOWHERE. H.M. GOVERNMENT WERE INEVITABLY DOUBTFUL AND SUSPICIOUS
OF ARGENTINE INTENTIONS. YOU WOULD BE BOUND TO INTERPRET WHAT
GALTIERI SAID AS NOTHING BUT A MEANS OF BUYING MORE TIME.

PARSONS

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