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Se refiere a:

22MAY82 0600Z(0700GB) – FCO SITREP. Informe detallado de la situación.

(PREM 19/630) (desclasificado DIC 2012)

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FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO STIREP (DETAILED VERSION) : 0700 HRS, 22 MAY

UN

(a) Developments on 21 May

1. In informal consultations of the Security Council it was quickly agreed, on the proposal of Ireland, that the Council should meet formally. But about an hour's wrangling then followed on a US proposal that the formal meeting should be held in private. This proposal fell when the President announced that Argentina was not prepared to participate in a private meeting.
2. At the formal meeting the Secretary-General gave an account, in neutral terms, of his activities since the adoption of SCR.502. He concluded by saying that efforts must continue to restore peace. Ros (Argentina) gave a wordy and repetitive speech seeking to contrast Argentine willingness to negotiate with our alleged rigidity. Sir A Parsons, in a speech which was well received, gave an account of recent events and of the course of negotiations. He also drew attention to the Argentine's violations of the basic principles of the Charter (peaceful settlement, non-use of force) while for our part we were acting within the terms of the Charter, specifically the inherent right of self-defence and the right of self-determination for the people of non-self-governing territories.
3. Dorr (Ireland) was not particularly helpful but he at least condemned Argentina for using force and held to SCR.502. Nisibori (Japan) made a helpful statement asking only for a resumption of negotiations. Correa da Costa (Brazil) made a careful statement calling for full implementation of SCR.502. Alborno (Ecuador) spoke strongly, but in somewhat confused terms, for Argentina. Street (Australia) gave a superb speech on the theme that Argentina began the crisis and is responsible for the consequences of its own recklessness. Jacob (Antigua and Barbuda) made a brief and helpful statement. The Council will resume at 221900Z.

(b) Sir A Parsons' Assessment

4. The first day has not gone badly. A number of delegations are thinking about Draft Resolutions; the Irish in terms of re-affirming SCR.502 with a ceasefire combined with a fresh mandate for the Secretary-General. The Spanish are floating an idea of a Security Council Commission, possibly including UN observers, which should go to the Falklands immediately to stop the fighting and enable negotiations to start for mutual withdrawal. Sir A Parsons has left the Irish and the Spanish in no doubt as to our views. Sir A Parsons believes it will be hard for anyone to bring a Draft Resolution to a vote today and that with luck Argentine, Venezuelan and Panamanian Foreign Ministers, who are expected in New York today, will produce a sufficiently extreme Resolution for the 9 votes to be in question and for us to secure negative votes from the US and the French.

(c) Message from the Secretary-General

5. The Secretary-General thanks the Secretary of State for his very kind message and expresses the hope that, in spite of the present impasse, it will be possible to resolve the crisis peacefully before too long.

((d))

(d) Press

6. The Argentine Mission are giving copies of their final paper to journalists (the 'Sunday Times' have a copy). Sir A Parsons suggests we might use this as grounds for giving copies unattributably to our customers and exploiting the openings which it offers.

Peruvian Initiative

7. HM Ambassador spoke to President Belaunde along the lines of paragraph 1 of FCO telegram No.122 to Lima. In reply Belaunde said that he had studied the documents explaining our position and this confirmed his belief that a ceasefire and a mutual and phased withdrawal of forces should be negotiated, leaving the substance and detail of the dispute for subsequent negotiations. The President said he could not give up his peace efforts and implied that the third sentence of our message to him (paragraph 1 of FCO telegram No.122 to Lima at Flag H) could be used to keep his initiative alive in the event of Argentine acceptance.

8. The Dutch Ambassador, Lima, has been told by his Argentine colleague that Argentina believes the Peruvian initiative is 'interesting' but that the Argentines understand we have rejected it and that therefore there would be no further point in an Argentine response. But according to an Argentine press report the Argentines have told the Peruvians that they accept the Peruvian proposal although they have also made minor observations on it.

US

9. The US Embassy, Buenos Aires, has reported that the Argentines are talking about breaking off relations with the US; one pretext being American materiel support for us and the publicity given to this in the American press. While admitting American responsibility for press leaks, Mr Haig hopes we will continue to avoid making public details of the support we are receiving. On instructions our Embassy had already raised the question of official comments on press leaks with both the State Department and the Pentagon. The US view is that they prefer to hold to present guidelines refusing to discuss specific requests for assistance from the UK or the response to these. The National Security Council issued a statement on 21 May which, inter alia, said 'we will, however, not address reports of specific requests for assistance or how we respond'.

Brazil and Exocet

10. The Secretary-General of the MFA has told our Ambassador that to his knowledge no Exocet missiles of any kind have been supplied from Brazilian official sources to Argentina; nor did he know of any intention to supply them in the future. (The Brazilians claim they have only the surface version of Exocet). The Secretary-General was less certain of the position concerning Exocets being sent through Brazilian intermediaries by a third country supplier, but he said he would see what he could do to check this.

FRG

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11. Herr Genscher has been unusually forthcoming and has invited our Ambassador to see him at any time concerning any help he might give us. HM Ambassador suggests we should consider whether we would wish to use this opening to pass Falklands or EC messages or attempts to argue our case.


Comment

12. Proceedings in the Security Council have so far gone more or less as predicted and do not in themselves point to a need for new instructions to Sir A Parsons. It is fortunate that the Australian Foreign Minister was on hand to give such strong support.

13. The Argentine position on the latest Peruvian proposals is unclear. But Belaunde is unlikely to leave matters as they now stand, especially if he receives encouragement from Buenos Aires. His ideas of a partial Argentine withdrawal to West Falkland in particular have no attraction. The Colombian Ambassador is to deliver a message from his President this morning; we have no details of its contents. We will need to consider how to respond.

14. Argentine release to the media of their final paper gives us a welcome opportunity to underline their inflexibility. We need to consider early action on this.

22 May 1982



A J Payne
Emergency Unit