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28MAY82 0600Z(0700GB) – FCO SITREP. Informe de situación a las 0700GB.

(PREM 19/632) (desclasificado diciembre 2012)

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FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION): 0700 28 MAY 1982

United Nations

A UKmis New
York tel no
874
B FCO tel no
1941

1. Sir A Parsons saw the UN Secretary General on 27 May in private to deliver the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's message in response to the Secretary General's request for a definition of satisfactory terms for a ceasefire. Perez de Cuellar had previously been telephoned by Haig and encouraged not to give up his efforts. Sir A Parsons stressed that we were not trying to buy time; he raised orally the possibility of visits to Buenos Aires and London. Perez de Cuellar was non-committal, but said that if he did decide on such a course he would make the visits himself rather than send an emissary. He thought the next step would be for him to see Costa Mendez on 28 May in New York or Washington.

2. Perez de Cuellar gave his personal view (to be protected even from Haig) that Costa Mendez and his team in the Foreign Ministry were inflexible. He undertook to pass on any substantive comments from the Argentine side.

Organisation of American States

C Washington
tel no 1941

3. The OAS meeting began in Washington on 27 May. There were venomous attacks on US support for the UK led by Argentina, joined by Venezuela, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Panama. There were attacks on the UK based on familiar clichés about "colonialism".

4. Haig made a determined and detailed speech which flirted with even-handedness, but eventually came out contrasting the reasonable UK attitude with Argentina's rejection out of hand of proposals for a solution.

5. Three draft resolutions were tabled and will be discussed in closed session on 28 May. Harmless proposals by Colombia and Costa Rica will be pitted against an Argentine draft calling on the US to cease its support for the UK and urging members to take appropriate but unspecified steps within the Rio Treaty framework to help Argentina resist British "aggression". The Embassy in Washington say that a hysteria is building up which could allow the adoption of a sharply hostile resolution but Brazil and Mexico have yet to speak and Argentina could run into stronger resistance in the closed session.

Initiative by Colombia/Brazil/Peru

D Lima tel
no 205
E Brasilia
tel no 214

6. The proposal put forward by the President of Colombia, allegedly on behalf of Colombia, Brazil and Peru has been given some further backing by Peru, but the Brazilians have indicated that they had no hand in drafting it and are highly sceptical about its prospects.

/Comment

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
SECRET

Comment

7. No immediate decisions are required on overnight developments in New York or Washington.

8. We appear so far to be retaining the UN Secretary-General's sympathy and his decision to seek the Argentine reaction personally from Costa Mendez in Washington has reduced the prospect of the issue being returned to the Security Council at the weekend. It looks, however, as if the Secretary-General will undertake visits to Buenos Aires and London only with the greatest reluctance or with some prior evidence of a change in positions.

9. It is too early to judge how matters will go at the Rio Treaty meeting. Although the first day was not encouraging, alternative moderate resolutions are being advanced and it remains to be seen to what extent the rhetoric will be translated into action. Much may depend on military developments and on the outcome of the Secretary-General's new mission.



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

28 May 1982

SECRET